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ABSTRACT
We examine the determinants of capital structure of Malaysian companies utilizing
data from 1984 to 1999. We classify data into four sub-periods that correspond to
different stages of Malaysian capital market. Debt is decomposed into three
categories: short-term, long-term and total debt. Both book value and market value
debt ratios are calculated.  The results of pooled OLS regressions show that
profitability, size, growth, risk and tangibility variables have significant influence on
all types of debt. These results are normally consistent with the results of fixed effect
estimation with the exception that risk variable loses its significance. Unlike the
evidence from the developed markets, investment opportunity (market-to-book value
ratio) has no significant impact on debt policy in the emerging market of Malaysia.
Our results are generally robust to time periods, but the significance of some variables
changes over time. Profitability has a persistent and consistent negative relationship
with all types of debt ratios in all periods and under all estimation methods. This
confirms the capital structure prediction of the pecking order theory in an emerging
capital market.1
INTRODUCTION
The landmark studies of Modigliani and Miller (1958; 1963) about capital structure
irrelevance and tax shield advantage paved way for the development of alternative
theories and a series of empirical research on capital structure. The alternative
theories include the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory and the agency theory.
All these and many other theories have been subjected to extensive empirical testing
in the context of developed countries, particularly USA (Harris and Reviv, 1991). A
few studies report international comparison of capital structure determinants (Wald,
1999; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). The empirical literature has been to identify some
stylized factors that relate to capital structure. There are a few studies that provide
evidence from the emerging markets of South-east Asia (Pandey et. al., 2000; Annuar
and Shamsher, 1993; Ariff, 1998). This study aims to investigate the determinants of
capital structure in the emerging Malaysian market.
Empirical evidence in developed countries show that firm characteristics have
different impact on different types of debt. For example, agency problem has different
implications for long-term and short-term debt. Similarly, risk may be negatively
correlated with long-term debt ratio but positively with short-term debt ratio. Further,
the economic conditions may have an important influence on the firm’s debt policy.
Our study examines the influence of growth, investment opportunity, profitability,
size, risk and tangibility on different types of debt ratios of Malaysian companies
utilizing data from 1984 to 1999 to capture the impact of different economic
conditions. We find that all these variables, except investment opportunity, have
significant relation with debt ratios. Our results reveal that profitability with its
negative relationship with debt ratios has the most dominant influence on debt policy
of Malaysian firms.
The remaining sections of the study are organized as follows: Section 2
presents an overview of literature on capital structure. Section 3 describes data and
research methodology. Section 4 reports results of the statistical analyses. Section 5
summarizes the main conclusions of the study.2
 LITERATURE REVIEW
Leverage can de defined in different ways. The definition of leverage depends on the
objective of the analysis (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). For example, for agency-
problem related studies of capital structure, leverage may be defined as debt-to-firm
value ratio. Interest coverage ratio is more suitable in a study of leverage and financial
distress. Other definitions of leverage include total liabilities-to-total assets, debt-to-
total assets, debt-to-net assets, and debt-to-capitalization. Further, debt could be
divided into its various components and numerator and denominator could be
measured in book value and market value terms.
Debt-to-assets (or debt-to-capital) is the most often used measure of leverage
in empirical studies. Since independent variables may have different effect on the
types of debt, we use three measures of leverage: long-term debt to total assets, short-
term debt to total assets and total debt to total assets ratios. Some previous research
studies  (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Pandey et. al., 2000; Chung, 1993) also use
different measures of leverage.  Each debt ratio is measured in book value and market
value terms. Thus, we use six measures of debt ratio as dependent variable. In the
market value debt ratio, the market value of debt is treated same as the book value and
the current market capitalization of equity is used as the market value of equity.
The selection of independent variables is primarily guided by the results from
previous empirical studies in the context of some developed and developing countries.
Our focus in this study is to examine the influence of these variables on the debt
policy of Malaysian firms rather to identify new variables. In a comparative cross-
country study, Rajan and Zingles (1995) find the following four important variables:
growth, tangibility, profitability and size. Many other studies (Titman and Wessels,
1988; Pandey et. al. 2000; Barclay and Smith, 1996; Castanias, 1983; Bradley, Janell
and Kim, 1984) also show risk (earnings volatility) and investment opportunity
(market-to-book value) as important determinants of debt policy. We use these six
variables in this study as independent variables and discuss below the theoretical and
empirical considerations underlying each one of them.
Growth: Firms whose sales grow rapidly often need to expand their fixed
assets. Thus high growth firms have greater future need for funds and also retain more
earnings. According to trade-off theory, the retained earnings of high growth firms3
increase and they issue more debt to maintain the target debt ratio. Thus, positive
relationship between debt ratio and growth is expected based on this argument. The
same relationship is supported by pecking order theory too. According to this, growth
causes firms to shift financing from new equity to debt, as they need more funds to
reduce the agency problem. Baskin (1989) reports a significant positive relation
between growth and leverage. On the other hand, Titman and Wessels (1988) find no
relationship.
Investment opportunities:  Investment opportunities represent a firm’s
intangible value that does not have collateral value. The intangible value is likely to
be lost if financial distress takes place. The risk of under-valuation and resource
diversion is quite high for firms with high intangible value (Myers, 1977). These
arguments suggest a negative relationship between debt ratio and investment
opportunities. But the agency problem may be lower for short-term debt than long-
term debt (Myers, 1977; Barclay and Smith, 1996 & 1999; Michaeles et. al. 1999).
Balance sheet does not capture the future investment opportunities rather share price
reflects them. Therefore, market-to-book value ratio is used as a proxy for investment
opportunities. Empirical evidence on the relationship between investment
opportunities (reflected through market-to-book value ratio) and capital structure is
not conclusive. Studies confirming a negative relation between investment
opportunities and long-term debt or total debt ratios include Titman and Wessels
(1988), Barclay et. al. (1995) Lasfer (1995), Rajan and Zingales (1995) Barclay and
Smith (1996). However, Michaelas et. al. (1999) report a positive relation of
investment opportunities with long-term and total debt ratio as well as with short-term
debt ratio. Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Barclay and Smith (1996) find negative
relationship between growth opportunities and all types of debt.
Profitability: According to the interest tax shield hypothesis, which is derived
from Modigliani and Miller (1963), firms with high profits would employ high debt to
gain tax benefits. On the contrary, the pecking order or asymmetric information
hypothesis of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) postulates that companies
prefer internal financing to debt to equity. Firms with higher profitability will employ
higher retained earning and less debt. The interest tax shield hypothesis may also not
work for those firms that have other avenues, like depreciation, to shield their taxes
(DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). Most empirical results confirm the pecking order4
hypothesis (Kester, 1986; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995;
Michaelas et. al., 1999).
Risk:  According to the trade-off theory,  higher risk (earnings volatility)
increases the probability of financial distress. Thus, it predicts a negative relationship
between leverage and risk. However, it is shown that for a negative relationship
between risk and leverage, bankruptcy costs should be quite large (Castanias, 1983;
Bradley, Janell and Kim, 1984). Further, Thies and Klock (1992) argue that risk has
negative relationship with long-term debt but positive relationship with short-term
debt as high variability shifts financing from long-term debt to short-term debt and
equity. Empirical results do not provide an unequivocal answer to the relationship
between risk and capital structure. Bradley, Janell and Kim (1984) find an inverse
relationship between earnings variability and leverage. But Titman and Wessels
(1984), Auerbatch (1985) and Ferri and Jones (1979) find no association between
earnings variability and leverage.
Size:  Large firms are likely to be more diversified and less prone to
bankruptcy (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). They are also expected to incur lower direct
costs in issuing debt or equity. Thus, large firms are expected to employ higher
amount of debt than small firms. It is also argued that smaller firms would have less
long-term debt and more short-term debt because of shareholders-lenders conflict
(Michaelas et. al., 1999; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Stohs and Mauer, 1996). The
empirical evidence is mixed. A large number of studies find a significant positive
relation between size and debt ratio (Lasfer, 1995; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Barclay
and Smith, 1996; Berger et. al., 1997). Kester (1986) and Remmers et. al. (1974) find
no significant effect of size on capital structure. Some studies reveal a positive
relation between size and debt maturities (Barclay and Smith, 1996; Stohs and Mauer,
1996; Michaelas et. al., 1999). It has also been shown that the relationship between
size and capital structure is sensitive to the chosen method of estimation (van der
Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Barclay et. al., 1995).
Tangibility: According to trade-off hypothesis, tangible assets act as collateral
and provide security to lenders in the event of financial distress. Collaterality also
protects lenders from moral hazard problem caused by the shareholders-lenders
conflict (Jensen and Mekling, 1976). Thus, firms with higher tangible assets are
expected to have high level of debt. According to the maturity principle, net fixed5
assets shift financing from short-term-debt to long-term debt while inventory shifts
financing from equity to short-term-debt and long-term debt (Thies and Klock, 1992).
As regards the empirical evidence, some studies report a significant positive
relationship between tangibility and total debt (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and
Zingales, 1995). There are other studies that find a positive relationship between
tangibility and long-term debt, but a negative relationship between tangibility and
short-term debt (van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Chittenden et. al., 1996; Stohs and
Mauer, 1996).
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We use data of the KLSE Main Board companies. The selected time period from 1984
to 1999 is intended to capture the differences in economic conditions of the Malaysian
economy. Companies that exist throughout the 16-year period with no missing data
are included in the study. We exclude the financial and securities sector companies as
their financial characteristics and use of leverage is substantially different from other
companies. We also exclude companies with zero sales and negative 4-year average
earnings. After eliminating outliers, the sample size is 106 companies for each period.
We adjust data of those companies, which change their financial year. Such changes
result in one year with missing data and the subsequent year data of more than 12
months.  We first annualize the subsequent year data, and then substitute missing data
by the mean value.
The entire period from 1984 to 1999 is divided into four sub-periods of four
years each: 1984-87, 1988-91, 1992-95 and 1996-99. Given the capital market and
general economic conditions in Malaysia, these four periods, respectively, correspond
with downturn, upturn, stability and growth and downturn
1. We calculate 4-year mean
values of variables, except for growth and earnings volatility, to minimize the
measurement error due to random fluctuations in variables. The dependent variable
(debt ratio) is regressed to the lagged independent variables to avoid the problem of
reverse causality.
                                                          
1 The average market returns were negative during 1984 and 1996-99 periods.6
In this study, we assume that the differences in debt ratios could result from a
firm’s dynamics through different time periods. Therefore, we pool data for sub-
periods and examine the influence of the firm characteristics on debt policy. With
lagged independent variables, our pooled sample consists of 318 observations. We use
pooled OLS regressions to understand the statistical relationship between debt ratios
and independent variables. We also report results of cross-sectional regression that
uses the mean values of variables of sub-periods. This approach ignores changes
through time. Therefore, our third approach is to use of the fixed effects model. This
approach examines the effect of independent variables on debt policy on the basis of
variation through time. We also estimate OLS regressions for each period separately.
The average debt ratio of period 1988-91 is regressed to the averages of independent
variables for the previous period of 1984-87 and so on. Our results, with some
differences, are generally robust to the estimation methods and the time periods. The
regression equation is as follows:
t , i 1 t , i 6 1 t , i 2 1 t , i 4 1 t , i 5 1 t , i 3 1 t , i 1 0 t , i T S R P IO G D ε + α + α + α + α + α + α + α = − − − − − −
  Debt ratio (D) is our dependent variable. We use six measures of debt ratio –
three book value and three market value ratios. Each component of debt -long-term,
short-term and total debt- is divided by total assets (or capital).
Growth (G) is measured as one plus growth rate derived by regressing log of
sales to time (four years).  As implied by the trade-off and the pecking order theories,
we hypothesize that growth is positively related to debt ratios.
Investment opportunities (IO) variable is approximated by market-to-book
value ratio since market value of shares is expected to reflect future potential of
investment opportunities. In accordance with the pecking order theory, we
hypothesize that investment opportunities have negative association with long-term
debt and positive association with short-term debt ratio.
Profitability (P) is defined as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided
by total assets (or capital). As per the pecking order hypothesis, we hypothesize that
profitability has a negative relation with debt ratios. The trade-off (or tax shield)
theory would be validated if we find a positive relation between profitability and debt
ratio.7
Risk (R) is computed as coefficient of variation in EBIT over four years. In
accordance with the trade-off theory, we hypothesize a positive association between
risk (earnings volatility) and debt ratio.
Size (S) is measured as natural log of sales. Sales are preferred over assets
since sales reflect current values. As suggested by the trade-off theory, we
hypothesize that size has a positive association with debt ratios. Alternatively, in view
of the empirical evidence, we could hypothesize that size has a positive association
with long-term debt and a negative relation with short-term debt.
Tangibility (T) is defined as fixed assets divided by total assets. In accordance
with the trade-off theory, we hypothesize a positive relationship between tangibility
and long-term debt ratio. On the other hand, as per the matching principle, we should
expect a positive relationship between tangibility and long-term debt ratio and a
negative relationship between tangibility and short-term debt ratio.
RESULTS
Table 1 provides means of the book value and market value debt ratios for the period
of 1988-99 and three sub-periods. On average, the KLSE companies employ low level
of debt. For the entire 12-year period, the book value total debt ratio is about 15%.
Mean long-term debt ratio is approximately half of the short-term debt ratio. The
maximum values are 31%, 37% and 56%, respectively, for long-term, short-term and
total debt ratios. The distribution of ratios is skewed towards lower end. The average
market value debt ratios are lower than the book value debt ratios.
Debt ratios do not show substantial change during the periods of 1988-91 and
1992-95, corresponding with stability and growing phases of Malaysian capital
market. During these two periods market value debt ratios are lower than the book
value debt ratios. In the third period of 1996-99, both book and market value debt
ratios increase. The market value debt ratios increase at a much higher rate than the
book value debt ratios. During this period, the Malaysian economy suffered a
downturn due to financial crisis that occurred in October 1997 and market prices of
shares fell.8
Table 1: Summary of Descriptive Statistics
 BLTD BSTD BTD MLTD MSTD MTD
Entire Period: 1988-99
 Mean 0.055 0.090 0.145 0.045 0.073 0.118
 Median 0.021 0.055 0.118 0.018 0.039 0.081
 Maximum 0.310 0.370 0.561 0.308 0.446 0.570
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Std. Dev. 0.070 0.093 0.137 0.061 0.084 0.125
 Skewness 1.320 0.871 0.606 1.708 1.298 1.072
 Kurtosis 4.063 2.715 2.262 5.877 4.300 3.553
Period 1: 1988-91
 Mean 0.038 0.091 0.130 0.028 0.068 0.096
 Median 0.015 0.059 0.099 0.011 0.038 0.065
 Maximum 0.187 0.346 0.452 0.158 0.283 0.366
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Std. Dev. 0.050 0.096 0.128 0.038 0.076 0.100
Period 2: 1992-95
 Mean 0.053 0.081 0.134 0.034 0.051 0.085
 Median 0.012 0.044 0.110 0.007 0.022 0.047
 Maximum 0.266 0.319 0.425 0.172 0.266 0.388
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Std. Dev. 0.068 0.086 0.131 0.045 0.060 0.092
Period 3: 1996-99
 Mean 0.073 0.098 0.171 0.073 0.100 0.173
 Median 0.048 0.067 0.146 0.052 0.064 0.147
 Maximum 0.310 0.370 0.561 0.308 0.446 0.570
 Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Std. Dev. 0.082 0.096 0.149 0.082 0.103 0.157
Table 2 provides correlation matrix for the pooled sample of 318 observations.
We observe that growth and profitability are positively related to the firm size, while
investment opportunity has a negative relationship with size. This implies that larger
firms tend to grow fast and have higher profitability, but they also have smaller
investment opportunities relative to their market value. Growth and profitability have
positive correlation with investment opportunity. Tangibility (FA/TA ratio) and risk
variables have insignificant correlation with other explanatory variables.
Growth and size variables have positive correlations with all types of book and
market value debt ratio. Profitability has negative correlation with all measures of
debt ratio. This implies that firms employ more debt as their growth and size increase,
but reduce debt as their profitability improves. Investment opportunities have
significant negative correlation with total debt and short-term debt ratios and
insignificant correlation with long-term debt ratios. Tangibility has similar association
with debt ratios. The correlation of risk is positive with long-term debt ratio and
negative with short-term debt ratio. But coefficients are insignificant. We do observe9
high correlation between book and market short-term debt ratios, long-tem debt ratios
and total debt ratios.
Table 2: Correlation Matrix – Pooled Sample
 BLTD BSTD BTD MLTD MSTD MTD GROWTH INVSOP PROFIT RISK SIZE TANGI
B-LTD 1.000                     
B-STD 0.417* 1.000                   
B-TD 0.788* 0.888* 1.000                 
M-LTD 0.929* 0.411* 0.748* 1.000               
M-STD 0.409* 0.913* 0.825* 0.484* 1.000             
M-TD 0.727* 0.810* 0.916* 0.812* 0.904* 1.000           
GROWTH 0.185* 0.156* 0.199* 0.217* 0.197* 0.238* 1.000         
INVSOP -0.088 -0.128* -0.131* -0.071 -0.116* -0.112* 0.170* 1.000       
PROFIT -0.274* -0.339* -0.368* -0.283* -0.328* -0.357* -0.015 0.302* 1.000     
RISK -0.036 0.111* 0.057 -0.033 0.055 0.021 0.017 0.062 -0.077 1.000   
SIZE 0.162* 0.208* 0.223* 0.201* 0.252* 0.266* 0.194* -0.221* 0.179* -0.019 1.000 
TANGI -0.060 -0.268* -0.212* -0.108 -0.281* -0.241* -0.020 -0.099 -0.006 0.034 0.049 1.000
* 5% significance level
Table 3 presents regressions results. We first discuss results of the pooled OLS
regressions.
Growth: We find a significant positive relation between growth and all types
of book and market value debt ratios. This finding supports both trade-off and pecking
order theories.  Malaysian firms have higher short-term than long-term debt ratios.
Thus, it seems that they employ short-term debt to finance their growth.
Investment opportunities: The multivariate-pooled OLS regression results
show that the coefficient of investment opportunity (market-to-book value ratio)
variable is insignificant throughout. This contradicts the pecking order theory of
Myers (1977, 1984) that suggests that companies with high market-to-book value
would have lower long-term debt ratios because of the problem of under-investment.
However, the correlation matrix shows that investment opportunity variable has
inverse relation with book and market value short-term debt and long-term debt ratios.
This simple correlation implies that firms with larger investment opportunities are
perceived by lenders to have higher risk (bankruptcy costs). It may be noted from the
correlation matrix that the market-to-book-value variable has a positive relation with
profitability and negative relation with size. It is thus probable that the influence of
investment opportunity is captured by size and profitability variables in the multiple
regressions.10
Table 3: Summary of Multiple Regressions Results
  B-TD    B-STD    B-LTD    M-TD    M-STD     M-LTD    
Variable coeff. t-stat. sig. coeff. t-stat. sig. coeff. t-stat. sig. coeff. t-stat. sig. coeff. t-stat. sig. coeff. t-stat. sig.
PANEL A: POOLED OLS MODEL
CONSTANT -0.148 -2.54 0.01 -0.058 -1.37 0.17 -0.090 -2.55 0.01 -0.214 -3.64 0.00 -0.107 -2.57 0.01 -0.107 -3.07 0.00
GROWTH 0.178 3.08 0.00 0.084 1.97 0.05 0.095 2.64 0.01 0.194 3.07 0.00 0.100 2.31 0.02 0.094 2.45 0.01
IVSOP 0.001 0.28 0.78 0.000 -0.04 0.97 0.001 0.55 0.59 0.002 0.86 0.39 0.001 0.45 0.65 0.002 1.12 0.26
PROFIT -1.049 -6.91 0.00 -0.644 -6.39 0.00 -0.406 -6.03 0.00 -0.978 -6.94 0.00 -0.591 -6.51 0.00 -0.387 -5.97 0.00
RISK 0.001 2.25 0.03 0.001 5.84 0.00 -0.001 -5.52 0.00 0.000 -0.17 0.87 0.001 2.69 0.01 -0.001 -5.34 0.00
SIZE 0.051 5.53 0.00 0.033 5.13 0.00 0.018 3.49 0.00 0.054 6.25 0.00 0.034 5.91 0.00 0.020 4.02 0.00
TANGI -0.133 -4.82 0.00 -0.113 -6.72 0.00 -0.019 -1.13 0.26 -0.135 -5.45 0.00 -0.106 -6.77 0.00 -0.029 -1.97 0.05
R-sq. 0.293 0.287 0.149 0.335 0.314 0.192
Adj. R-sq. 0.279 0.273 0.133 0.322 0.301 0.176
F-stat. 21.442 20.880 9.092 26.149 23.779 12.289
PANEL B: MEANS OF VARIABLES OLS MODEL
CONSTANT -0.270 -1.68 0.10 -0.208 -1.87 0.06 -0.062 -0.97 0.34 -0.167 -1.45 0.15 -0.122 -1.47 0.14 -0.045 -1.00 0.32
GROWTH 0.330 1.94 0.06 0.255 2.08 0.04 0.075 1.13 0.26 0.216 1.72 0.09 0.155 1.64 0.10 0.061 1.24 0.22
IVSOP 0.001 0.25 0.80 0.001 0.31 0.76 0.000 0.13 0.89 -0.002 -0.75 0.46 -0.001 -0.55 0.58 -0.001 -0.88 0.38
PROFIT -0.912 -3.93 0.00 -0.605 -3.60 0.00 -0.307 -3.94 0.00 -0.741 -4.24 0.00 -0.513 -3.97 0.00 -0.229 -4.04 0.00
RISK 0.052 2.64 0.01 0.038 3.02 0.00 0.014 1.42 0.16 0.043 2.47 0.02 0.030 2.72 0.01 0.013 1.64 0.11
SIZE 0.038 2.82 0.01 0.028 2.92 0.00 0.010 1.75 0.08 0.031 2.90 0.00 0.024 2.93 0.00 0.006 1.57 0.12
TANGI -0.140 -3.40 0.00 -0.131 -4.65 0.00 -0.009 -0.46 0.65 -0.122 -3.85 0.00 -0.115 -5.06 0.00 -0.007 -0.47 0.64
R-sq. 0.328 0.329 0.162 0.369 0.370 0.180
Adj. R-sq. 0.288 0.288 0.111 0.330 0.332 0.131
F-stat. 8.067 8.090 3.184 9.630 9.710 3.628
PANEL C: FIXED  EFFECTS MODEL
GROWTH 0.215 3.13 0.00 0.107 2.20 0.03 0.108 2.86 0.00 0.233 3.29 0.00 0.124 2.62 0.01 0.108 2.85 0.00
IVSOP -0.002 -0.57 0.57 -0.002 -0.99 0.32 0.000 -0.05 0.96 0.002 0.66 0.51 0.001 0.39 0.70 0.001 0.69 0.49
PROFIT -0.736 -4.56 0.00 -0.430 -3.96 0.00 -0.305 -3.92 0.00 -0.712 -4.98 0.00 -0.411 -4.41 0.00 -0.301 -4.25 0.00
RISK 0.000 0.56 0.58 0.000 0.83 0.41 0.000 -0.51 0.61 0.000 1.71 0.09 0.000 2.98 0.00 0.000 -1.30 0.20
SIZE 0.034 2.96 0.00 0.017 2.07 0.04 0.017 2.47 0.01 0.057 5.29 0.00 0.031 4.11 0.00 0.026 4.14 0.00
TANGI -0.094 -3.03 0.00 -0.072 -3.78 0.00 -0.023 -1.27 0.21 -0.108 -3.77 0.00 -0.074 -4.36 0.00 -0.034 -2.08 0.04
R-sq. 0.631 0.626 0.511 0.622 0.598 0.506
Adj. R-sq. 0.432 0.424 0.247 0.419 0.382 0.239
F-stat. 70.477   68.826   42.969    67.865    61.395    42.132   
Note:
(1) t-statistics are based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance
(2) F-statistics are significant at 0.01 level.
Profitability: Our results show that profitability has a significant inverse
relation with all types of book and market value debt ratios. These results confirm
findings of earlier studies and are consistent with pecking order theory (Myers, 1984)
that postulates a negative relationship between profitability and debt ratio. The
negative relationship between profitability and debt ratios contradict the tax shield
hypothesis. Profitability seems to be the most dominant determinant of debt ratios of11
Malaysian firms as it generally has high beta coefficients and t-statistics that are
significant at 1% level of significance.
Risk: We find a negative relation of earnings volatility with book and market
value long-term debt ratio, which is consistent with the trade-off theory. Our results
also reveal a positive relation between risk and short-term debt ratios. This finding
vindicates the view that high variability shifts financing from long-term debt to short-
term debt and equity (Thies and Klock, 1992).
Size:  We find that size is positively related to all types of book and market
value debt ratios. All coefficients are significant at 0.01 level of significance. The
positive correlation between size and debt ratios confirms the hypothesis that larger
firms tend to be more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy and the direct cost of
issuing debt or equity is smaller. This is consistent with the trade-off theory.
Tangibility: Our results indicate a significant negative relation of tangibility
(FA/TA ratio) with book and market value short-term debt ratios. This confirms the
maturity matching principle.  The relation of tangibility with the market value long-
term debt ratio is also significantly negative while with book value long-term ratio it
is not statistically significant. These results contradict the trade-off theory that
postulates a positive correlation between long-tem debt ratio and tangibility since
fixed assets act as collateral in debt issues. The negative relation between tangibility
and total debt ratio suggests that short-term debt is more than the collateralized long-
term debt. Overall, our results are consistent with DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) who
suggest an inverse correlation between tangibility and debt ratio. Yet another
argument for the negative relationship is the traditional view that firms with higher
operating leverage (high fixed assets) would employ lower financial leverage (both
long- and short-term debt).
In Panels B and C of Table 3 we also present the results of means of variables
OLS regressions and fixed effects model. These results show how much of the pooled
OLS results can be attributed to debt ratio adjustment through time periods and how
much to the differences in debt ratios among firms. The results of the means of
variables OLS regressions are broadly similar to the results of the pooled OLS
regressions, but adjusted R-squared values are generally higher. The results reveal
that book and market value total debt and short-term debt ratios are explained better
by the independent variables than the long-term debt ratios. Also, the explanatory12
power of growth variable is lower. The adjusted R-squared values for short-term and
total debt ratios are about 30% or more while for long-term ratios they are about 11-
13%. The fixed effects model results in Panel C reveal that the explanatory power of
regressions is considerably enhanced. The adjusted R-squared values are much higher
than under pooled OLS and means of variables OLS models. The results of the fixed
effects model reveal an important difference as compared to pooled and means of
variables OLS regressions. The coefficient of risk variable becomes insignificant in
the case of book value debt ratios as dependent variable. This implies that the
relationship between debt ratios and risk is influenced when the firm effects are
controlled. The relatively high adjusted R-squared values in OLS means of variables
and fixed effects regressions indicate that independent variables significantly explain
both the cross-sectional and time series variations in debt policy of Malaysian firms.
The results of the regression models as discussed above do establish that
growth, profitability, risk and tangibility variables explain the cross-sectional and
time-series variations in debt policy of Malaysian firms. The Malaysian economy has
passed through different economic stages during last decade or so. When we run OLS
regressions for each time period separately, we do observe some differences in the
explanatory power of independent variables, but results are generally robust to
different time periods.  Table 4 provides regression results for each time period.
Profitability is the most consistent variable in influencing debt policy and it has a
significant inverse relation with all debt ratios in all periods. It may be noted that
profitability, size, risk and tangibility variables also show consistent influence over
short-term and total debt ratios in all periods. Size is positively related with all debt
ratios in periods one and three and with short-term and long-term debt ratios in period
2. Tangibility variable has a significant negative relation with debt ratios except that
its coefficient is insignificant for market value long-term debt ratio in period 2 and
book and market value long-term debt ratios in period 3. Risk variable has a positive
relation with short-term and total debt ratios in period 1, all ratios in period 2 and
book value short-term debt ratio in period 3. Risk variable shows a negative relation
with book and market value long-term debt ratios and market value total debt ratio in
period 3. Growth variable has a significant positive relation with book and market
value short-term and long-term debt ratios in period 1. Its coefficient is not significant13
in periods 2 and 3. Investment opportunity as in the pooled regressions has no
relationship with debt ratios.
Table 4: Regression Results for Each Period
  BTD     BSTD  BLTD    MTD    MSTD MLTD   
Variable Coeff. t-stat. Sig. Coeff.. t-stat. Sig.  Coeff. t-stat. sig. Coeff.. t-stat. Sig. Coeff. t-stat. Sig. Coeff. t-stat. Sig.
PANEL A: OLS MODEL - PERIOD 1: 1988-91
Constant -0.270 -1.68 0.10 -0.208 -1.87 0.06 -0.062 -0.97 0.34 -0.167 -1.45 0.15 -0.122 -1.47 0.14 -0.045 -1.00 0.32
Growth 0.330 1.94 0.06 0.255 2.08 0.04 0.075 1.13 0.26 0.216 1.72 0.09 0.155 1.64 0.10 0.061 1.24 0.22
Invst. Opp. 0.001 0.25 0.80 0.001 0.31 0.76 0.000 0.13 0.89 -0.002 -0.75 0.46 -0.001 -0.55 0.58 -0.001 -0.88 0.38
Profitability -0.912 -3.93 0.00 -0.605 -3.60 0.00 -0.307 -3.94 0.00 -0.741 -4.24 0.00 -0.513 -3.97 0.00 -0.229 -4.04 0.00
Risk 0.052 2.64 0.01 0.038 3.02 0.00 0.014 1.42 0.16 0.043 2.47 0.02 0.030 2.72 0.01 0.013 1.64 0.11
Size 0.038 2.82 0.01 0.028 2.92 0.00 0.010 1.75 0.08 0.031 2.90 0.00 0.024 2.93 0.00 0.006 1.57 0.12
Tangibility -0.140 -3.40 0.00 -0.131 -4.65 0.00 -0.009 -0.46 0.65 -0.122 -3.85 0.00 -0.115 -5.06 0.00 -0.007 -0.47 0.64
R-sq. 0.328 0.329 0.162 0.369 0.370 0.180
Adj. R-sq. 0.288 0.288 0.111 0.330 0.332 0.131
F-statistic 8.067 8.090 3.184 9.630 9.710 3.628
PANEL B: OLS MODEL - PERIOD 2: 1992-95
Constant -0.020 -0.14 0.89 -0.010 -0.12 0.91 -0.010 -0.12 0.91 -0.024 -0.24 0.81 -0.017 -0.32 0.75 -0.007 -0.11 0.91
Growth 0.097 0.62 0.54 -0.009 -0.11 0.91 0.106 1.09 0.28 0.062 0.58 0.57 -0.002 -0.03 0.98 0.064 0.97 0.33
Invst. Opp. -0.002 -0.32 0.75 0.003 1.04 0.30 -0.005 -1.64 0.10 -0.002 -0.68 0.50 0.001 0.46 0.65 -0.003 -1.52 0.13
Profitability -0.930 -4.72 0.00 -0.583 -4.79 0.00 -0.346 -3.57 0.00 -0.694 -4.98 0.00 -0.435 -5.23 0.00 -0.259 -3.82 0.00
Risk 0.085 4.84 0.00 0.067 5.48 0.00 0.019 1.74 0.08 0.060 4.15 0.00 0.045 5.06 0.00 0.015 1.94 0.05
Size 0.033 2.12 0.04 0.034 3.42 0.00 -0.001 -0.17 0.87 0.026 2.49 0.01 0.025 3.87 0.00 0.001 0.16 0.87
Tangibility -0.141 -3.26 0.00 -0.124 -4.89 0.00 -0.017 -0.61 0.54 -0.108 -3.67 0.00 -0.090 -5.10 0.00 -0.018 -1.00 0.32
R-sq. 0.344 0.415 0.147 0.389 0.458 0.182
Adj. R-sq. 0.304 0.379 0.095 0.352 0.425 0.132
F-statistic 8.647 11.689 2.846 10.508 13.942 3.669
PANEL C: OLS MODEL - PERIOD 3: 1996-99
Constant -0.280 -2.49 0.01 -0.146 -1.74 0.09 -0.134 -1.81 0.07 -0.153 -1.31 0.19 -0.078 -0.85 0.40 -0.075 -0.98 0.33
Growth 0.116 1.63 0.11 0.061 1.16 0.25 0.055 1.04 0.30 0.112 1.28 0.20 0.066 1.03 0.31 0.046 0.76 0.45
Invst. Opp. 0.007 1.17 0.24 0.003 0.80 0.43 0.004 1.17 0.24 0.002 0.31 0.76 0.000 -0.06 0.95 0.002 0.64 0.52
Profitability -1.343 -6.18 0.00 -0.755 -5.14 0.00 -0.589 -4.31 0.00 -1.437 -5.94 0.00 -0.778 -4.64 0.00 -0.658 -4.70 0.00
Risk 0.000 1.36 0.18 0.001 8.50 0.00 -0.001 -6.10 0.00 -0.001 -2.91 0.00 0.000 1.16 0.25 -0.001 -6.16 0.00
Size 0.088 4.24 0.00 0.051 3.24 0.00 0.037 3.13 0.00 0.074 3.55 0.00 0.042 2.69 0.01 0.032 2.76 0.01
Tangibility -0.117 -2.07 0.04 -0.100 -2.98 0.00 -0.017 -0.45 0.65 -0.150 -2.67 0.01 -0.108 -2.93 0.00 -0.042 -1.23 0.22
R-sq. 0.344 0.328 0.192 0.364 0.291 0.242
Adj. R-sq. 0.304 0.287 0.143 0.326 0.248 0.196
F-statistic 8.638   8.059  3.925   9.450  6.764   5.261   
Note:
(1) t-statistics are based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance
(2) Most F-statistics are significant at 0.01 level and some at 0.05 level.
CONCLUSION
Malaysian firms employ low debt ratios. The long-term (1988-1999) averages for
long-term, short-term and total debt ratio are, respectively, 5%, 9% and 15%. Short-
term debt ratio is twice of long-term debt ratio. The debt ratios are generally stable
during the periods of 1988-91 and 1992-95. They show increase in the 1996-99
period. Malaysia suffered financial crisis in 1997 and went through economic slow14
down during this period. Companies suffered losses and their market capitalization
fell. This perhaps caused increase in debt ratios after 1996.
As regards the determinants of debt policy of Malaysian firms, the results of
pooled OLS regressions show that growth and size variables have a significant
positive relationship with all types of debt ratios and profitability has a significant
negative relationship. Risk (earnings volatility) is negatively related with long-term
debt ratios and positively with short-term debt ratios. We also find that tangibility
(fixed-assets-to-total assets ratio) has a negative association with book value and
market value short-term and market value long-term debt ratios. Its relationship with
book value long-term debt is insignificant.
The results of means of variables OLS regressions are generally similar to the
pooled OLS regression except that the explanatory power of growth variable weakens.
The use of the fixed effects model improves estimation further. The only significant
difference as compared to pooled OLS regressions is that risk variable becomes
insignificant in the case of book value debt ratios as dependent variable. Our results
are also generally robust to time periods. The results of OLS regressions for each
period reveal that profitability, size, risk and tangibility have consistent influence over
short-term and total debt ratios. There are some differences in results across time in
the case of long-term ratio as dependent variable. Profitability is the most persistent
variable that has a significant negative influence on all types of debt ratios in all
periods. The explanatory power of independent variables is higher for short-term debt
ratios than long-term debt ratios as revealed by adjusted R-squares values.  Our results
also uncover that market value debt ratios are explained better by independent
variables than book value debt ratios.
Data availability is a major limitation in capital structure and other finance
studies in emerging capital markets. For example, the R & D expenditure data is not
available for companies in Malaysia. Similarly, no data on stock betas are available.
Researchers have to spend a lot of time in data collection and processing because of
the lack of validated databases in emerging markets like Malaysia.  In future as more
data becomes available, one could explore to identify additional variables that have
influence on debt policy of companies in Malaysia. A study investigating the role of
ownership structure and agency costs in debt policy of Malaysian firms could be
undertaken.15
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